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Abstract
This paper analyzes the role that can be played by aggregation as a regulatory model for the effective 
structuring of a country’s gas sector, with a focus on how aggregation has functioned and is and could 
be functioning, in certain countries.
Aggregation, in one form or another, has enjoyed a colorful history in the regulatory shaping of several 
gas sectors. It has been applied successfully to the definition of nascent gas sectors in Trinidad and 
Tobago and the United Kingdom. Aggregation has been applied, with varying degrees of success, to the 
re-regulation of gas sectors in Singapore, Ghana and Tanzania; it has been threatened to be applied in 
Israel and Indonesia; and it has almost certainly failed in Nigeria.
Aggregation is but one of a number of regulatory models that can be used to structure the gas sector 
within a country’s wider economy, and is the particular focus of this paper. This paper recognizes 
that there is no single or preferred model for the optimum regulation of the gas sector within any 
particular country, and different countries could take different views as to what they believe to be the 
most suitable regulatory model for their own particular gas sectors. This paper also recognizes that 
neither is there anything as simple as an agreed menu of established regulatory models for gas sector 
structuring, from which an appropriate selection can be made.
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2مقالة بحثية
تجميع الغاز كنموذج تنظيمي لتحسين أمن إمدادات الغاز 
المحلية
بيتر روبرتز
مدير في �سركة كوزمو�س اإنرجي واأ�ستاذ زائر في القانون جامعة اأو�سترال
moc.ygrenesyekssorc@ortep
ملخص
ُت�سهم هذه الدرا�سة في تحليل دور تجميع الغاز كنموذج تنظيمي لهيكلة قطاع الغاز ب�سكل فعال في الدولة، وذلك مع 
التركيز على كيفية تاأدية تجميع الغاز في بع�س الدول. يت�سم تجميع الغاز، ب�سكل اأو باآخر، بتاريخ متنوع على �سعيد ت�سكيل 
منظم للعديد من قطاعات الغاز. وقد ُطّبق ب�سكل ناجح في تعريف قطاعات الغاز النا�سئة في ترينداد وتوباغو والمملكة 
المتحدة. وقد تم تجميع الغاز، بدرجات متفاوتة من النجاح، في اإعادة تنظيم قطاعات الغاز في �سنغافورة وغانا وتنزانيا، 
كما ُهدد اأن يتم تجميع الغاز في اإ�سرائيل واإندوني�سيا، ولم تنجح عملية تجميعه في نيجيريا.
 ُيعد تجميع الغاز من النماذج التنظيمية التي يمكن ا�ستخدامها لهيكلة قطاع الغاز �سمن اقت�ساد الدولة، وترتكز 
هذه الدرا�سة ب�سكل خا�س على ذلك. وتعتبر هذه الدرا�سة اأنه ل يوجد نموذج واحد اأو مف�سل للتنظيم الأمثل لقطاع الغاز 
�سمن دولة معينة، وتختلف الدول من حيث اعتبار النموذج التنظيمي الأمثل لقطاع الغاز الخا�س بها. كما تعتبر هذه 
الدرا�سة اأنه ل يوجد قائمة ب�سيطة اأو متفق عليها للنماذج المحددة لتنظيم هيكلة قطاع الغاز، والتي ُيمكن اختيار ما هو 
منا�سب منها.
الكلمات المفتاحية : تنظيم، تجميع، الغاز، نموذج ال�ساري الواحد
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3Introduction—Aggregation and How It Fits with Wider Gas Sector Regulation
This paper analyzes the role that can be played by the concept of aggregation as a regulatory model for the 
effective structuring of a country’s gas sector, with a focus on how aggregation has functioned and is and 
could be functioning, in certain countries that have experimented with the aggregation concept.
Applying the simplest literal sense and in the context of the regulatory structuring of a gas sector, 
“aggregation” entails the imposition of some form of intermediary between gas suppliers and gas 
consumers and the consolidation of supply and/or demand in order to create critical mass within the 
market. This is a very basic explanation of the concept; the practical examples of the use of aggregation 
in certain countries, which are discussed further in this paper, will offer a greater explanation of what 
aggregation really means when it comes to gas sector regulation.
Before focusing on aggregation, it would be helpful to first consider the wider purpose of “regulation.” 
Regulation refers to the manifestation of some form of governmental intervention in a particular industrial 
sector, through controlling or directing the activities of the sector’s participants, to achieve a desired 
outcome or to mitigate a particular shortcoming. The customary rationale for the need for the regulation 
of a sector stems from the perceived failure of that sector to effectively regulate itself through the 
efforts of its participants. Because of this failure, a government feels compelled to intervene with certain 
corrective measures. These measures might be necessary for a variety of reasons, that could include: To 
protect consumer interests; to promote investment and economic growth; to make provisions for new 
market entrants as sector participants; to protect existing sector participants’ economic interests; to 
ensure free and fair competition between all sector participants; to break down monopoly and oligopoly 
positions and to prevent dominant position abuses; and to provide greater clarity and certainty relating 
to the current and prospective operation of the sector.
Regulation, however well-intentioned it may be, is not an activity devoid of risk. Regulation could be 
used improperly in order to promote certain vested interests, and regulation could also result in certain 
unintended consequences, depending upon how it is effected. There could be an inhibition of natural 
business competitiveness because of regulation and regulation could operate as a disincentive to continued 
investment. The costs of doing business could be increased and the very presence of regulation inevitably 
opens the door to the risks of regulatory capture or regulatory failure.
Within any program of planned regulatory reform, before introducing new regulation or refining existing 
regulation, two questions must be asked:
(1) What is the mischief complained of in the particular sector requiring regulation, and why does the 
current re gulatory structure (if any) of the sector allow that mischief to subsist?
(2) Which regulatory model is appropriate to cure the mischief complained of, and how would that model 
work?
One of the most common reasons for regulatory intervention into the gas sector of a country that relies 
on the use of gas for its domestic energy needs is to promote what is usually summarized as security of 
supply. That is, within a country’s energy sector, the prevailing market conditions will facilitate the safe 
and uninterrupted delivery of gas volumes to be sufficient to meet the needs of all gas users (whether 
industrial or domestic consumers) at prices that are economically sustainable to suppliers and consumers 
alike.
It could be that this security of supply objective is achieved naturally, as a product of the application of 
prevailing market forces. Alternatively, security of supply could be manufactured through some form of 
regulatory intervention. Such an intervention could be required where it is apparent that reliance upon 
the operation of market forces to provide security of supply would not be fruitful. Such an intervention 
might be needed, for example, where it is necessary to compel the diversion of a certain measure of gas 
for supply into a domestic market, rather than for such gas to be sold exclusively for export through a 
pipeline or as liquefied natural gas (LNG).
4Gas sector regulatory interventions, in various forms, are commonplace and are generally regarded as 
being sometimes necessary (and temporary) on the road of transition to a freely functioning, competitive 
gas sector. Once the policy goal of security of supply has been realized, the regulatory intervention that 
delivered it could be abrogated if the supply of gas has become a naturally operative function of the 
market. Recognizing when this point of transition has come and breaking up a regulatory structure that 
could grow to benefit certain incumbents can be difficult to achieve, however.
Aggregation, the particular focus of this paper, is but one of a number of regulatory interventions that 
could be used to structure the gas sector within a country’s wider economy. There is no single or preferred 
model for the optimum regulation of the gas sector within any particular country, and different countries 
take different views as to what they believe to be the most suitable regulatory model for their own 
particular gas sectors. Neither is there anything as simple as an agreed menu of established regulatory 
models for gas sector structuring, from which an appropriate selection can be made.1 Aggregation is only 
one of the possible paths up the mountain. In an unrefined state that does not take account of the local 
conditions within which it exists, it is neither the best nor the worst possible regulatory option.
. 1 Aggregation—What Does It Actually Mean?
In the context of structuring a gas sector and in the simplest literal sense, aggregation entails the 
imposition of some form of intermediary between a gas supplier and a gas consumer, as a conduit 
through which the sale and purchase of gas between the supplier and the consumer is intended to flow. 
Supplier Aggregator Consumer
TransactionsTransactions
Aggregation promotes the consolidation of supply and/or demand in order to create critical mass within 
a market, and it can take a number of different forms. Aggregation could be represented as a form of 
introductory brokerage between suppliers and consumers, or it could take the form of active market 
modelling and manipulation. There is no single way of illustrating the concept and in practice it has 
manifested itself in a number of gas sectors internationally in various guises. Aggregation could also 
come into existence for a number of different reasons, depending on the individual regulatory needs of 
the sector in which it is being applied. These various forms and reasons are considered further below.
Because of intervention into the functioning of a gas sector, aggregation is sometimes seen (unfairly) 
as an indication of failure in the natural development of that sector. Such a view assumes that the 
most perfect regulatory model and to which all gas sectors should aspire, is that which permits willing 
sellers and willing buyers to freely engage with each other for the sale and purchase of gas, without 
the interference of any form of intermediary. It will therefore be helpful to appreciate the role that 
aggregation can play in order to understand the paradigm of gas sector modeling which the willing 
seller/willing buyer model is widely assumed to be.
In the willing seller/willing buyer model, the supply of gas is an openly contestable activity, with 
freedom of contracting choice and the absence of intermediates in the basic commercial relationship.
Sellers Buyers
Transactions
1- A useful indication of some of the possible options can be found in Andrej Juris, The emergence of markets in the natural 
gas industry, World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1895, March 1, 1998.
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and is characterized by the following principal features:
(1) Freedom of pricing—The price payable by a buyer to a seller for the sale of gas is the product of 
open negotiation between the parties. A seller’s natural commercial inclination will be to sell gas 
to whichever buyer is willing to pay the highest price (and not to sell gas at all where the seller 
believes that the economic recovery from doing so is inadequate).
(2) Freedom to contract—A seller cannot be compelled to contract to sell gas to a buyer that the 
seller does not want to contract with. A seller might be unwilling to contract with a particular 
buyer because the proposed price is too low, because of concerns about any other commercial 
terms, or simply because of some antipathy toward the buyer.
(3) Freedom of contract terms—The contract terms that apply between a buyer and a seller for the 
sale of gas will be those that are arrived at through open negotiation between the parties (except 
to the extent that the parties have agreed to rely, wholly or in part, on any industry-wide standard 
contract terms for the sale and purchase of gas).
The essential element of freedom of contracting, which characterizes this regulatory model, also 
creates the model’s principal drawback: because a seller is not obliged to sell gas to a buyer, whether 
at a price that it regards as being inadequate or for any other reason, then there might exist a buyer 
that is denied the opportunity to buy gas from a seller (and possibly even from all sellers). The free 
application of market forces, which is consistent with the very nature of this model, could inhibit the 
natural growth of the sector.
The willing seller/willing buyer model requires a mature, well-populated, transparent sector for 
its most effective operation. The United Kingdom is often held out by regulatory economists as the 
exemplar of a “perfect” gas sector that reflects the practical operation of this model. In the United 
Kingdom today gas is bought and sold, at both wholesale and consumer levels, between willing sellers 
and willing buyers on commercially agreed prices, without the interference of any form of aggregation 
and often using published contract forms. State intervention is relatively minimal, the licensing of 
sector participants is done transparently, there are relatively low barriers to market entry, and third-
party access principles facilitate opportunities for greater participation. General competition law 
principles and truly independent sector regulation also exist to underpin fair dealing and to prevent 
the establishment of positions of dominance and the risk of market manipulation. The United Kingdom 
has a gas sector that self-regulates and defines itself by the free and fair competition it openly 
encourages.
The transition to the willing seller/willing buyer model in economies that have historically applied more 
interventionist gas supply structures has also been a feature of European Union gas sector regulatory 
policies over the last twenty years (with, for example, the transition to the model being made as part 
of the emergence of a fully contestable gas supply sector in Denmark (2004) and Bulgaria (2007)).1
In Israel a willing seller/willing buyer model has applied to date for the consumption of indigenous 
offshore gas production, with large industrial gas consumers and power generation companies 
contracting directly with gas suppliers for long-term supplies of gas. The price of gas and the form of 
the contract used, is freely negotiated between sellers and buyers. Some concern has been expressed, 
however, that an oligopoly is effectively being operated by the limited number of gas suppliers who 
together control the upstream gas market, with the consequence of consumers paying prices for 
gas higher than the prices that might be paid if there were greater competition among upstream 
1- See, for example, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/energy-union-track-deliver.
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which would regulate the price of gas going into the downstream by being the sole buyer and sole 
seller of upstream gas production. This, paradoxically, would be an example of a gas sector moving 
away from the perceived paradigm in order to provide what is hoped to be a more efficient economic 
solution.
More recent developments in the Israeli gas sector, notably in the form of suggested gas exports by 
pipeline to Egypt and Jordan, could further serve to distinguish the Israeli gas market between domestic 
and export consumers and could offer fresh impetus to calls for domestic market gas aggregation.
. 2 The Possible Reasons for Introducing Aggregation and the Possible Problems 
with Doing So
Aggregation should not be regarded as an objective in its own right, which could be brought into 
existence by the regulator of a gas sector simply because it applies and even appears to have worked, 
in some other gas sectors. Rather, aggregation should be considered only as a means of introducing, or 
supporting the growth of a successful gas sector.
A number of possible operational deficiencies might be identified in respect to a particular gas sector 
(regardless of whether the sector is nascent, or is already established and perceived to be performing 
poorly) for which the introduction of some form of aggregation has sometimes (rightly or wrongly) 
been suggested as a potential remedy. This list of deficiencies would normally include some or all of 
the following (together with, in each case, any indication of how aggregation might be of assistance in 
delivering effective sectoral reform):
(1) Lack of essential gas infrastructure—It may be that within a particular country the amount 
of gas transmission, distribution and storage infrastructure in existence at any particular time 
is insufficient to allow for the development of a gas-based national energy economy capable of 
bringing the benefits of gas consumption to all domestic and industrial consumers, regardless of 
geography. As a vicious circle, a lack of infrastructure to deliver gas to consumers offers little 
incentive for suppliers to sell gas and an absence of gas sales commitments obviates the need to 
invest in the development of such infrastructure. A government might lack the financial resources 
to develop that infrastructure itself and the potential returns to be earned by private sector 
investors might be insufficiently attractive for them to wish to do so. Deadlock ensues. The 
introduction of a new entity that is able (or even obliged) to apply the financial returns it enjoys 
from occupying its position as an aggregator toward the development of new gas infrastructure 
could be the catalyst for new infrastructure investment and market growth.
(2) Imbalances of bargaining power—It could be that gas is sold to consumers by suppliers who hold 
an unfairly disproportionate degree of bargaining power, such that those suppliers are able to 
command the commercial terms (both price and non-price) of their choosing and even to decide 
to whom they choose not to sell gas, however capricious the reason for not doing so might be. This 
risk can also apply the other way too, with consumers holding the balance of power over suppliers. 
The application of general principles of competition law (which could preclude market fixing and 
the abuse of positions of dominance) could simply be too slow and cumbersome to offer any sort 
of practical solution to an affected party. The introduction of a new entity that consolidates the 
requirements of all consumers, or of all suppliers, through the introduction of an aggregation 
function could make the process of negotiating terms for the sale and purchase of gas fairer, more 
balanced and more efficient among the intended sector participants.
1- See, for example, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/1.670907. See also http://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/technical_reports/2009/RAND_TR747.pdf.
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who can offer to pay the highest prices. This could result in the direction of indigenous gas 
production to export markets or, within a country, only to those consumers who can afford to pay 
the higher prices.1 In either case gas production simply might not be penetrating the domestic gas 
sector (evenly or at all). The introduction of a regulatory requirement that a certain proportion 
of domestic gas production must be channeled through an entity that performs an aggregation 
function could result in gas being available for sale, purchase, and consumption within the country 
and could result in a fairer distribution of gas to different groups of consumers.
(4) Marginalization of new gas discoveries—The point made above about suppliers being inclined to 
sell their gas production to the highest paying consumers supposes that the suppliers will actually 
want to produce gas in the first place. It may be that a supplier that has made a discovery of 
gas views that discovery as not being worthy of a declaration of commerciality if there is any 
combination of a lack of realizable access to export markets and poor prospects for selling gas to 
domestic consumers who can offer comfort that they will pay attractive prices for that gas. This 
could lead to the creation of stranded gas deposits within the country’s patrimony and stasis in the 
proper exploitation of the country’s mineral wealth. The introduction of an aggregation model could 
give impetus to the promotion of gas discoveries, by giving greater certainty regarding the potential 
consumer universe and the commercial terms on the offer for the sale and purchase of gas.
(5) Imbalanced realized gas prices—Because in certain countries certain consumers of gas can afford 
to pay higher prices for that gas than other consumers, those consumers who can only afford to pay 
low gas prices will not be the natural customer of choice for suppliers and these consumers could 
be effectively excluded from the ability to participate in the growth of a gas sector. A mechanism 
could be needed whereby the gas prices that can be paid to suppliers from certain consumers are 
higher, or whereby all gas prices that are payable are harmonized, in order to encourage suppliers 
to sell their gas more widely. The introduction of some form of price consolidation through an 
entity as part of the performance of a wider aggregation function could apply such a mechanism 
(although this approach is not without its own attendant problems; see below).
(6) Payment failure and credit risk—Poor payment history on the part of existing consumers, and 
an inability to secure reliable credible support to underpin the payment obligations of those 
consumers (which in turn could be a consequence of the poor payment history they offer) are 
often endemic features within a developing gas sector. This gives suppliers a further disincentive 
to want to supply gas to those consumers, which in turn further inhibits the development of the 
sector. If an aggregator is appointed to act as principal in the buy-side and sell-side relationships, 
then suppliers will shift the payment risk to the aggregator as the buyer, which could be a more 
attractive proposition for them (although this benefit is not realized if the aggregator acts only as 
a broker between suppliers and consumers and does not intermediate itself in that relationship as 
a fully contracted principal).
(7) Unnecessary gas contracting complexity—The contracts required for the sale and purchase of 
gas between suppliers and consumers could be realized piecemeal on a transaction-specific basis. 
Those contracts could be relatively complex and the negotiation of them could be expensive, time 
1- A particular example of this to note is the position occupied in certain energy economies by electric power generators. The 
amounts they can afford to pay for gas as a feedstock for power generation could be a direct netback from the prevailing 
prices which they in turn are paid for generated power. It is axiomatic that low power prices will lead to low gas prices. 
Alternatively, industrial manufacturers and petrochemical producers could generate comparably better returns from their 
business activities, and they could be able to pay comparably higher prices for gas. This has, for example, been the case 
in Nigeria (see http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/04/22/world-bank-to-help-nigeria-improve-gas-
supply-and-reliability-and-bring-more-electricity-to-nigerian-consumers and http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/684961468197340692/pdf/101751-WP-P151987-Box393265B-PUBLIC-Nigeria-Economic-Report-2015-web-version.pdf).
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could be party, and because of the aggregator’s natural desire for consistency in the application 
of those contracts, an aggregator could develop and apply relatively standard contract terms for 
the sale and purchase of gas to the parties on both sides of the aggregation function. This could 
speed up transaction times and reduce contracting complexities and costs.
(8) Imperfect regulatory control—There could be a concern on the part of a government that 
inadequate regulatory control is being exercised over certain aspects of a gas sector. This 
inadequacy could be a consequence of any combination of poorly applied existing regulatory 
functions, regulatory capture, or pseudo-regulation by certain sector participants. The imposition 
of an aggregator with clear responsibility for the regulation of the activities of the sector in 
which it is active could provide a greater measure of regulatory certainty (although this could 
also be seen as a poor substitute for the simpler expedient of taking firmer control of the existing 
regulatory situation).
As a regulatory model, aggregation can be used to address many of the operational deficiencies 
identified above, but the model is not without its own attendant pitfalls and problems:
(1) Complexity—Aggregation introduces an additional layer of administration, cost and complexity 
into what could otherwise be represented by a relatively simple set of bilateral gas sale and 
purchase arrangements in the willing seller/willing buyer model (assuming of course that such a 
model could be readily applied into a gas sector, which is not always the case).
(2) Anti-competitiveness—Aggregation is sometimes regarded as being inherently anti-competitive 
because of the high degree of market intervention it represents. Aggregation is also sometimes 
seen as a model that hinders the effective development of a truly contestable gas sector (although 
this could simply be an issue of timing, depending upon how long gas aggregation is intended to 
be implemented within a gas sector as part of a transitional structure to a different outcome).
(3) Risk of manipulation—An aggregator could be exposed to the risk of manipulation by industry 
participants who might seek to take control of the aggregation function and apply it to serve their 
own commercial needs (although the extent to which this sort of regulatory capture is a real risk 
depends on how the ownership, operation, funding and management structures of the aggregator 
are effected in practice). Aggregation might not be a popular option and the regulatory intention 
behind it could be defeated by the action or inaction of some sector participants.
(4) Quasi-regulation—An aggregator could (whether intentionally or not) exercise a quasi-regulatory 
function, which confuses the regulatory landscape and usurps the real gas sector regulator’s 
functions (although this risk could be mitigated by clear and effective sector regulation and 
indeed this feature could be intended as a requirement of the aggregation function).
(5) Improper application—An aggregator could exercise its responsibilities improperly and to the 
detriment of the development of the sector, such as through how the aggregator elects to match 
up supplier and consumer opportunities and the determinations the aggregator makes relating 
to suitability to contract (although this risk could be mitigated by clear operational principles 
regarding the functioning of the aggregator and by the right of an aggrieved person to appeal to a 
truly independent sector regulator in order to arbitrate any differences).
(6) Improper selection—The wrong form of aggregation could be selected and applied within a particular 
gas sector (or the right form of aggregation could be selected but could be wrongly applied). It may 
be, for example, that aggregation with price consolidation (see below) is a critical requirement, 
but it is not applied within the aggregation model. This could lead to a failure of the intended 
aggregation function, and to an unfair general assumption that aggregation does not work.
9. 3 The Structural Options for Introducing Aggregation
Aggregation can take a number of different forms and there is no single way of illustrating or realizing 
the concept. Nor will any single version of what might be regarded as a form of aggregation necessarily 
eliminate all of the structural deficiencies identified above.
The following examples indicate how aggregation, in some form or other, has manifested itself in 
practice in the structuring of certain gas sectors to date:
(1) Block purchasing/block selling
Aggregation can be seen in a structure whereby a group of market participants consolidate their 
commercial activities so that they have a stronger collective negotiating position.
In sell-side gas aggregation1 a number of small gas suppliers could band together to sell their gas en 
bloc, acting as a single seller, to a consumer. That consumer could be a state agency or a significant 
consumer that enjoys monopsony buying power. The economic theory behind this aggregation is 
that the suppliers will have a stronger negotiating position (for price and other commercial terms) 
against the consumer if they act in unison through such aggregation.
Transactions
Supplier Consumer
Consumer
Consumer
Consumer
Consumer
Correspondingly, in buy-side gas aggregation2 a number of small gas consumers could band together 
to buy their gas en bloc, acting as a single buyer, from a supplier. That supplier could be a state 
agency or a significant producer that enjoys monopoly selling power. The economic theory behind 
this aggregation is that the consumers will have a stronger negotiating position (for price and other 
commercial terms) against the supplier if they act in unison through such aggregation.
Such aggregation, whether sell-side or buy-side, usually happens naturally as a relatively localized 
commercial activity within a given gas market and as the needs of the market participants dictate.
(2) Aggregation through a buy/sell principal
In this aggregation structure, an intermediary will buy gas as a principal from a supplier and will 
sell gas as a principal to a consumer, sitting between the ultimate seller and the ultimate buyer. 
This activity could be repeated with many different principals on either side, thereby constituting 
that intermediary as an aggregator of a number of sell-side and buy-side gas trades. This form of 
aggregation is sometimes known as the “single buyer” model for obvious structural reasons.
A supplier might prefer the idea of selling large volumes of gas to a single buyer that has taken 
the risk of aggregating fragmented downstream demand, compared to the idea of entering into a 
multiplicity of contracts to sell gas to multiple downstream consumers.
1- See http://www.westtexasgas.com/other-businesses/wtg-gas-marketing/ for an example of sell-side gas aggregation into 
a local energy market.
2- See  http://www.puco.ohio.gov/puco/be-informed/consumer-topics/governmental-energy-aggregation-local-community-
buying-power/#sthash.9Yxa3QoS.dpbs for an example of buy-side gas aggregation into a local energy market.
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The aggregator would take the risk of non-payment from its sale-side supplier counterparts 
(as well as the responsibility for securing adequate credit support in respect of their payment 
obligations), would take the risk of performance failure from its buy-side consumer counterparts 
and would assume all of the scheduling, matching and working capital management risks inherent 
in performing such a pivotal role between both sides of the market.
This is a highly involved form of aggregation and it could be accompanied by the statutory grant of 
a position of market exclusivity in favor of such an aggregator.
The buy/sell principal model has the apparent advantages of applying structural simplicity (through 
avoiding the need for a multiplicity of bilateral contracts), creating economic advantage (because 
the aggregator takes the risk of non-payment from downstream consumers) and of bringing an 
overall economy of scale to a gas sector, but the model could also be seen as a vehicle for the 
promotion of vested interests in a sector where the need for model is not obviously apparent.
The aggregator inevitably has transaction costs associated with the performance of its function. 
These costs are typically met through exploiting the positive margin generated by buying gas for x 
and selling gas for x+. The aggregator could generate significant profits from the arbitrage position 
it enjoys. The sector regulator might be required to control these profits in order to protect the 
development of the sector.
The aggregator could have significant working capital commitments (depending upon how the 
timings of the purchase commitments and sales receipts are structured). If the aggregator is not 
inherently creditworthy in its own regard, then some degree of state support might be needed. This 
ultimately confers upon the state the economic incidence of the model, which undermines the very 
purpose of introducing the regulatory model.
Examples of the use of aggregation through a buy/sell principal model to regulate a gas sector 
include the following:
The United Kingdom
The British Gas Corporation (BGC) is a prime (albeit now historical) example of such an aggregator. 
The BGC came into existence as the beneficiary of a statutorily created entitlement to be the 
exclusive participant in the United Kingdom gas sector for the performance of its functions. The 
primary intention was to facilitate the economic engineering of the United Kingdom gas sector 
in a way as to fund key gas transportation infrastructure development without governmental 
involvement.
The first discoveries of commercially recoverable quantities of offshore gas in the United Kingdom 
were made in the mid-1960s by several independent oil companies holding government-granted 
licenses for petroleum exploration and production. As more offshore gas production emerged in 
the early 1970s, it became a requirement that all offshore gas production be sold to BGC. This was 
a statutorily constituted monopsony established by the Gas Act 1972, with BGC having exclusive 
rights to buy gas production at such prices and on such terms as it required. BGC then sold the 
produced gas to domestic and industrial buyers, acting as a monopoly seller.
As part of its mandate the BGC had the exclusive right and responsibility to develop, own and 
operate the national gas grid. Known today as the National Transmission System (NTS), the national 
gas grid was the network of transmission and distribution pipelines that transported gas across the 
United Kingdom, from the points where it came ashore to the various points of consumption. This 
process did not start with BGC, because BGC inherited a series of localized gas pipelines when it 
came into existence, but BGC applied consistency to the effort to develop a national gas grid and 
became the driving force behind the NTS as it appears today. The significant stipend which was 
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afforded to BGC through the position of exclusivity it enjoyed in the bulk purchase and resale of 
gas production enabled BGC to fund infrastructure development.
Trinidad and Tobago
The buy/sell principal model is in use today in Trinidad and Tobago, where the National Gas Company 
(NGC) is the sole seller and buyer of gas and effects the arbitrage between upstream production 
and downstream demand.1
Originally formed in 1975 and with what it openly calls “unparalleled state-led involvement in 
natural gas development,” NGC was mandated to participate in gas commercialization ventures to 
enhance the value of gas and was made the sole local distributor of gas. NGC’s objective was to 
establish and attract gas-based industries, to negotiate long-term natural gas contracts (and prices) 
with suppliers and consumers and to develop and manage the country’s gas transmission system. 
The building of gas transmission infrastructure by NGC in particular was seen by oil companies as 
an incentive to produce gas, as the presence of such infrastructure led to the promotion of a local 
market for gas commercialization.
The role of NGC as the sole buyer and seller of all gas produced within Trinidad and Tobago, as 
the principal gas transmission company that owns and operates a network of onshore and offshore 
gas transmission lines and which enjoys a monopoly position as a strategically placed midstream 
operator with strong linkages to upstream and downstream activities, has been instrumental in 
commercializing relatively modest amounts of indigenous gas and making a major contribution to 
the country’s economic growth.
More recently, the Trinidadian government has discussed the possibility of setting up a subsidiary 
company that would receive and aggregate upstream gas production for further allocation between 
domestic and export needs.2
Singapore
In Singapore, demand for gas (as a feedstock for petrochemical production and power generation) 
had been increasing in the early 2000s and the ability to meet that demand from existing import 
pipeline gas supplies was looking increasingly less certain. Liberalization of the gas and power 
markets in Singapore also led to the emergence of new market entrants as gas buyers, keen to 
secure reliable supplies of gas in order to develop their projects. LNG imports were identified by 
the Singapore government as a means of meeting the changing demand profile. The problem faced 
by the Singapore government was one of matching the demands of a number of downstream gas 
buyers, with fragmented demand patterns and uncertain timing requirements, with the prospect 
of a long-term, secure supply of LNG.
The proposed solution was the introduction of an exclusive gas aggregator (but solely for LNG 
imports—several preexisting gas pipeline import projects continued to enjoy autonomy and the 
ability to sell gas directly into the market). In 2008 BG Singapore Gas Marketing Pte Ltd (now 
Shell Gas Marketing Pte Ltd) was appointed by the Singapore Energy Marketing Authority (EMA) 
as the exclusive aggregator for the first three million tonnes per annum of LNG demand, for a 
fifteen-year franchise term. The aggregator was intended to handle the interface between multiple 
downstream gas buyers and upstream LNG suppliers, as the sole buyer of LNG into Singapore and 
the sole seller of regasified LNG to downstream gas buyers.3
In this model the aggregator takes credit risk on downstream gas buyers because the upstream 
1- See http://ngc.co.tt/.
2- www.offshore-technology.com/comment/lng-demand-incentives-development-trinidads-natural-gas-discoveries.
3- See www.ema.gov.sg/Shell_Gas_Marketing_Pte_Ltd.aspx.
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payment obligations of the aggregator for the LNG supplied are not conditioned by the prior 
receipt of downstream gas payments by the aggregator. The aggregator is therefore keen to vet 
the payment covenant of prospective gas buyers wishing to participate in the aggregation model.
Aggregation has been noted for having made a significant contribution to meeting Singapore’s gas 
security of supply challenges and offering a number of benefits.1 The consolidation of downstream 
demand maximized buyer power while also allowing those buyers to meet their individual needs for 
gas, often with staggered project start-up timings, from a secure source of supply. Furthermore, 
having a single buyer of LNG at the import terminal simplified terminal usage and start-up 
operations.
The Singapore aggregation model does have some perceived disadvantages too. There is no 
opportunity for a major prospective buyer of LNG in the downstream market to contract directly 
with LNG suppliers, so buyers could miss the opportunity to exploit a buyer-friendly LNG market. 
Despite the assertion that the model maximizes buyer power, the reality is that buyers have no real 
power when negotiating gas prices or other commercial terms with the aggregator, as they have no 
alternative sources of supply against which they can leverage their position.
(3) Aggregation by brokerage
In this aggregation structure, an intermediary mediates gas sale and purchase arrangements 
between suppliers and consumers but does not assume a direct contracting role in the relationship 
between them.
Nigeria has a gas sector in which the creation of an aggregator to compel the supply of gas into the 
domestic economy (for the benefit of the economy itself and to counteract the more attractive 
prospects for higher-priced exports of gas via pipeline or as LNG) has taken place but without the 
aggregator becoming involved as a buy/sell principal. This aggregator, a limited liability company 
called the Gas Aggregation Company of Nigeria (GACN), acts as a broker between suppliers and 
consumers who still contract directly with each other.2
To guarantee the presence of sufficient volumes of affordable gas to meet domestic demand, the 
Nigerian legal regime obliges suppliers to dedicate a defined percentage of their total gas production 
to the domestic market, under a domestic supply obligation (DSO). In contrast to the aggregation 
function performed by BGC described above, GACN performs a portfolio management role but does 
not contract as principal in the buying and selling of gas. Gas sales and aggregation agreements 
(GSAAs) are made directly between sellers and buyers, with GACN appearing additionally as a party 
to the contract but only to effect the brokerage function.
Sale and purchase commitment
GSAA
Supplier GACN Consumer
GACN manages an escrow account into which buyers’ payments for gas are deposited, but GACN 
does not act as the guarantor of a buyer’s payment obligations. The escrow arrangement is intended 
to provide some security of payment in favor of a seller but not collateral support (although neither 
is it realistically expected that the aggregator will be relied upon to perform a true credit support 
1- For more on developments in Singapore, see Paul Turner & Anthony Barker, Singapore—Emergence of a new LNG market and 
the role of the aggregator (http://www.gastechnology.org/Training/Documents/LNG17-proceedings/1-1-Anthony_Barker.
pdf). See also https://www.ema.gov.sg/LNG_Procurement.aspx.
2- http://www.gacn.com/about-us/.
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function in this model). Thus it is still imperative that there is a bankable gas sales relationship 
between the seller and the buyer, with the buyer’s solvency at the heart of that relationship.
The introduction of gas aggregation in Nigeria has not been a smooth process. Much remains to be 
done and it cannot be said that the intended regulation has been successful. The Nigerian model of 
gas aggregation (and price consolidation; see below) has not functioned as effectively as hoped and 
the Nigerian gas sector has not developed in line with the expectations underpinning the advent of 
the model. Some ten years after its introduction, the business of aggregation is still not underway 
for a number of separate but related reasons. GACN has matched up certain sellers and buyers of 
gas, but the GSAAs that have been signed are not unconditional and not guaranteed to perform. 
The DSO has not been applied consistently to all producers, the risks of poor payment continue, the 
market still lacks a clear and reliable gas pricing methodology and uncertainty persists about who 
is responsible for regulating the Nigerian gas sector. Stranded gas deposits (which the aggregation 
model was supposed to make commercial) remain stranded, associated gas continues to be flared 
and there is no confidence that future revenue streams from domestic gas production will ever 
be sufficient to justify making significant investments into gas production and transportation 
infrastructure. Bilateral gas sale and purchase arrangements, in which higher market prices earn 
greater security of supply, have continued to prevail, and buyers, who are incapable of paying a 
price for gas to open the door to such arrangements, have continued to suffer. In June, 2017, the 
Federal Government of Nigeria approved a new national gas policy, part of which emphasized a 
managed movement toward the willing seller/willing buyer model and away from the concept of 
gas aggregation, which almost certainly means the end of GACN.1
(4) Aggregation for price consolidation
Aggregation could be applied to harmonize the prices paid for gas by consumers to suppliers, so 
that there is no longer an economic justification for suppliers to refuse to sell gas to consumers able 
only to pay lower prices for that gas.
Under the Nigerian gas aggregation model, a gas supplier is paid a single aggregated price for 
its gas, regardless of the identity of the consumer to whom the gas is sold. To effect this price 
consolidation, GACN takes all the sales prices payable by all the consumers (which could be different 
prices, depending on the sectors into which gas is being bought) and then remits a single, averaged 
price to all of the suppliers. The consumer pays the same price that it would otherwise have paid 
and sees no consequence of the price consolidation. All of the suppliers, however, receive a single, 
consolidated price.
GACN
Supplier
Supplier
Supplier
Consumer 1
Consumer 2
Consumer 3
$ 1
/m
scf
$ 3/mscf
$ 2/mscf$ 2/mscf
$ 2
/m
scf
$ 2/mscf
This model of price consolidation recognizes that not all consumers can afford to pay the same (that 
is, the highest) price for gas and reduces the commercial incentive for a supplier to sell gas only to 
the highest-priced consumer within a particular market. This is intended to facilitate the flow of 
1- See www.templars-law.com/up-content/uploads/2017/07/THE-NATIONAL-GAS-POLICY2c-2017.pdf.
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gas to sectors of the downstream gas market that are economically less attractive to suppliers, to 
consumers who otherwise would have no economic basis to interact. It allows those consumers to 
establish gas demand and dependency in their markets and to improve their economic position over 
time. This could be an essential part of the evolution of a truly contestable gas sector.
Price consolidation will be inherently distortive of true market economics because of the obvious 
subsidy it creates. Price consolidation provides a poor incentive to suppliers, who are exposed 
to receiving consolidated prices that are lower than actually realizable prices and thus reduces 
the natural inclination of those suppliers to want to develop gas projects and to supply gas into 
the market. It also gives a poor signal to consumers who enjoy the cross-subsidization that the 
consolidation affords them, because it gives them no incentive (for as long as consolidation exists 
in their favor) to want to improve their businesses so that they can pay something closer to true 
market prices for gas. Price consolidation could be an impediment to the emergence of a truly 
contestable market because suppliers are denied the prices they could otherwise achieve and 
because certain consumers are afforded access to gas supplies at prices they would not otherwise 
merit. Also, the single, consolidated price that is on offer to suppliers to compensate them for their 
gas sales usually makes no adjustment for the differing costs of gas production among different 
suppliers. Consequently, the lowest cost supplier makes the greatest return, and the highest cost 
supplier makes the lowest return. This could further disincentivize suppliers from undertaking new 
gas projects.
Aggregated gas sales with price consolidation could expose some suppliers to the receipt of an 
aggregated gas price that could be lower than the price payable under a bilateral (disaggregated) 
gas sales arrangement. This gives those suppliers an incentive to avoid aggregation in favor 
of pursuing sales under a bilateral arrangement, which they could seek to do by ensuring the 
aggregation arrangements remain ineffective for as long as possible, so that aggregation never 
comes into play. There is some suggestion that this has been happening in Nigeria.
(5) Aggregation for governmental consolidation
It could be that the creation of an aggregator enhances the degree of control that the government 
has over the gas sector. In such a case, the aggregator would effectively be functioning as the 
regulator of those aspects of the sector in which it is active (and the functioning of the regulator 
of the relationship between the aggregator, acting as a quasi-regulator and the actual appointed 
sector regulator would need to be made clear). The following are examples of countries where 
aggregation appears to have been promoted with the consequence of consolidating government 
influence (intentionally or not):
Indonesia
Indonesia signaled a move toward the introduction of a national gas aggregator with the issuance of 
a draft Presidential Regulation on natural gas management in 2015.1 The principal objectives of this 
step appeared to be to ensure the availability of an adequate and uninterrupted supply of gas into 
the domestic sector (with the ancillary benefit of promoting the development of the upstream gas 
sector and the development of new sources of gas production), to promote the development of gas 
transmission and distribution infrastructure by pooling supply and demand, to increase the use of 
gas in the domestic sector (and to meet the needs of consumers), and to make gas truly affordable 
in Indonesia, including ending the disparity of pricing among gas consumers in different areas.
A wide operational remit has been suggested for the intended gas aggregator. This remit would 
include the functions of buying gas produced by production sharing contract (PSC) contractors, 
1- Mailinda Eka Yuniza et al., Natural gas aggregation and the opportunity for synchronization under Indonesian Law, Journal 
of World Energy Law and Business, 9, 388–409 (2016).
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importing gas to meet national demand, aggregating gas supplies, determining the sales price for 
consumers, consummating gas sales arrangements (which could also include taking over control 
of existing contracts for the sale and purchase of gas previously been entered into between PSC 
contractors and state-owned gas and electricity companies) and constructing gas transmission and 
distribution infrastructure.
The draft Presidential Regulation envisaged: (1) the creation of a number of separate aggregators 
(each of whom would be state-owned enterprises), each with responsibility for the management 
of a defined aggregation area (which could be local, regional, or national); and (2) the possibility 
of separate supply-side aggregators (for the management of procuring gas) and demand-side 
aggregators (for the management of selling and supplying gas). Any existing aggregation activities 
already being effected would be assigned to a state-owned enterprise, to act as aggregator.
One of the possible candidates for the assumption of at least some part of the aggregation function, 
it has been suggested, could be Pertamina, the former state oil and gas company. The exact detail 
of how this multiplicity of aggregators is intended to function has yet to be worked out, and 
the Presidential Regulation has remained a draft, but the intention of interposing state-owned 
enterprises into this function is clear (although the draft also denies that an aggregator will have 
regulatory responsibilities).
The logic for having a high degree of state interference in the creation and operation of an 
aggregation function could be derived from the prevailing legal and regulatory regime within 
which such aggregation is intended to take place. In the Indonesian context, the Constitution 
of 1945 obliges the state to intervene to protect the welfare of the people, and particularly so 
in the context of managing indigenous energy resources, which, some argue, could extend to 
implementing a regulatory framework that best meets indigenous demands for gas. 
Tanzania
In October 2013 the Tanzanian government issued the National Natural Gas Policy of Tanzania 
(NNGPT), which sought to provide guidance for the development of the Tanzanian domestic gas 
sector. The NNGPT states that priority will be given to the development of gas for the domestic 
market over export possibilities. At the heart of the NNGPT was the proposed establishment of 
an aggregator (defined in the NNGPT as “a fully state owned enterprise which will have exclusive 
rights to purchase, collect, transport and sell natural gas produced in the country”).
From this, a new Petroleum Act came into force at the end of 2015 and introduced a wide-ranging 
regulatory framework for all aspects of the oil and gas sector in Tanzania. Under the act, which 
updated and consolidated several earlier pieces of legislation, the Tanzania Petroleum Development 
Corporation (TPDC), a state-owned enterprise, was mandated as the official national oil company 
and was granted the exclusive rights to manage the country’s gas sector, including (whether by 
itself or through subsidiaries) the aggregation of gas and the ownership and operation of major gas 
infrastructure items. The act also provided for a DSO for gas to apply to all producers. Exactly how 
TPDC will perform this management function and what form the aggregation model will take and 
still remain to be seen, although the act was also careful to state that TPDC’s role as aggregator 
would not extend to the management of gas intended to be exported in the form of LNG.1
Ghana
The Ghana gas market has seen the introduction of and the subsequent movement away from, a 
single buyer model for gas, with the creation of the Ghana National Gas Company (GNGC). GNGC 
was a state-owned entity that was intended to act as the exclusive marketing interface between 
1- See www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/netotiating-tanzania-gas-future.pdf.
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offshore gas producers and downstream gas buyers (principally power generators) in the sale of 
associated and non-associated gas. This regulatory intervention was made essentially to create a 
measure of involvement in the operation of the gas sector for a new state-owned enterprise and 
not because of any perceived failing in the sector.
Early experience suggested that the presence of GNGC increased transaction times and costs and 
added an unnecessary layer of contractual complexity. There was also a concern that GNGC was 
not, in and of itself, inherently creditworthy and that upstream gas producers were not exposed to 
any improvement in the risk of non-payment by downstream buyers that they otherwise would have 
assumed in direct gas sales. Consequently, more recent developments have seen the absorption 
of GNGC into the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) and the movement toward 
disaggregated gas sales for certain projects.
More recently, the Ghanaian government economic forecasting has focused on aggregated delivered 
gas prices across a variety of indigenous and imported gas sources.1
. 4 Aggregation as a Transitional Step
The introduction of aggregation, in whatever form it takes, into a gas sector does not have to be a 
permanent feature. Indeed, a regulatory intervention such as the creation of an aggregator is usually 
intended to be a temporary measure (although how long “temporary” means is always debatable) on 
the road of transition to a competitive gas sector. Once the policy goal of security of supply of gas 
has been realized, then the regulatory intervention could be abrogated when the effective supply of 
gas has become a naturally operative function within the sector. That said, it could of course become 
apparent that aggregation functions well in its own right and should continue to apply.
If transition is the intention, because of a concern that the continuing presence of aggregated trades 
could lead to market distortions and could prevent true competition from flourishing, then care needs 
to be taken to recognize the point at which a gas sector has generated sufficient depth that it could 
be regarded as self-sustaining through bilateral trades without aggregation. But recognizing exactly 
when this transition point has been reached can be a difficult.
The development of the United Kingdom gas sector is a good example of how aggregation was used 
to perform a critical role in establishing the sector before being discontinued. The United Kingdom 
gas sector today illustrates the willing seller/willing buyer model in operation, yet it was not always 
so. The sector evolved from a much more managed model, which openly applied gas aggregation to 
establish the first iteration of the sector.
BGC had a short but spectacular life. Created in 1972, BGC was privatized as British Gas Plc in 1986, 
as part of the drive toward liberalization of the United Kingdom gas sector and in a series of later 
demergers in 1997 and 2000, British Gas Plc was broken up into several separate businesses (one of 
which was a separated owner and operator of the NTS). As part of the process of liberalization, the 
sale of United Kingdom gas production from offshore producers to onshore consumers became an open 
and contestable activity for the first time.
It is perhaps easy, when viewed from the comfort of an age of regulatory enlightenment, to view the 
existence of a monolithic creature like the BGC as grotesque, but such hindsight ignores the reality 
that the gas aggregation model the BGC represented was an essential and unavoidable first step on the 
road to establishing the success that is the United Kingdom gas sector is today. Without gas aggregation 
the United Kingdom would have struggled to launch straight into a successful willing seller/willing 
buyer model as significant volumes of offshore gas production came into the market. The negotiation 
of contract terms, gas pricing, and risk allocation might have taken place in a localized and partisan 
1- www.energycom.gov.gh/planning/data-center/energy-outlook-for-ghana?
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manner and perhaps only the economically most favorable deals would have survived. Producers might 
even have turned their backs on offshore gas project development prospects without a meaningful 
buy-side opportunity to tap into. The gas transportation infrastructure needed to develop a deep and 
liquid market for multiparty gas sale and purchase contracting was also not there. The NTS might not 
have been built, at least in the form that it exists today and the matching up of supply and demand 
through available pipeline capacity would only have happened through small-scale, bilateral pipeline 
development deals. The NTS, if it would have developed at all as such, might only have developed 
piecemeal, with inconsistent standards and poor national coverage.
Conclusion
Aggregation has a number of different meanings. There is no single model for aggregation that is capable 
of universal application to all gas sectors and while there may be many perceived operational deficiencies 
within a particular gas sector, aggregation (in whatever form is chosen) will not necessarily remove all 
of those deficiencies in a stroke. Aggregation has to be tailored specifically to reflect the regulatory 
needs of the sector in which it is intended to operate, and before any process of aggregation is embarked 
upon, there must first be a careful consideration of the regulatory and economic objectives that such 
aggregation intends to secure, to ensure that the model will deliver against those objectives and will not 
be doomed to failure at the outset.
Aggregation, in one form or another, has enjoyed a colorful history in the regulatory shaping of several gas 
sectors. It has been applied successfully to the definition of nascent gas sectors in Trinidad and Tobago and 
the United Kingdom. It has been applied, with varying degrees of success to the gas sectors in Singapore, 
Ghana and Tanzania and it has been threatened to be applied in Israel and Indonesia. It has almost 
certainly failed in Nigeria. In none of these instances have the existing conditions for the application of 
the model, nor have the eventual outcomes (where it has been applied) been the same.
Aggregation is a flexible model, capable of being deployed differentially and of achieving different results, 
which means that it must be applied purposefully and with great care if it is to be effective. If executed 
properly, aggregation can help in the promotion of an effective gas sector that offers security of supply 
and protections that all of the sector participants need. But proper execution requires that a careful 
construction of the right form of aggregation be applied to the sector, as there is no single expression 
of aggregation. The easy mistake to make, when it comes to introducing any program of regulatory 
engineering to better develop a gas sector, is to go straight to asking how the sector should be regulated. 
The essential question to ask first is why the sector needs to be regulated differently to how it already is. 
Only then, when the mischief that the regulatory model is intended to remedy has been clearly identified, 
will there be a better chance of selecting and applying the right regulatory model and making that model 
work. And that model might, or might not, be aggregation.
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